In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Life of Roman Republicanism by Joy ConnollyT. P. WisemanJoy Connolly. The Life of Roman Republicanism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014. xix + 228 pp. Cloth. $39.95.This book was written for the best of reasons. Joy Connolly explains in her preface that she began to study the republican tradition in 2001, when “the Bush administration’s imprudence, paranoia, and disregard of democratic values stoked in me an anger equalled (...) only by the disgust I felt at my own and my fellow citizens’ inability or unwillingness to stand up to it” (xiv). The failure of the Left caused her “to ask questions that might help us to respond more intelligently and humanly to the situation in which we find ourselves” (xv). In particular, in this book her aim has been to exploit texts from the late Roman republic, to which students of political science have not paid enough attention, and thus recover “the suppressed history of republican political thought” (204). As she says in [End Page 372] conclusion, “I have sought to offer practical tools for civic education by articulating learnable practices of knowing the world that characterize late republican texts” (208, author’s emphasis). How well has this admirable ambition been achieved?According to the introduction, “[t]his book seeks to place Cicero’s Verrines, Caesarian orations, Republic, and Laws; Sallust’s Catiline and Jugurtha; and Horace’s Satires at the center of the republican tradition” (1); however, the Verrines and De legibus get only a couple of paragraphs each, and only one of the “Caesarian” orations is discussed at all. The actual contents are: chapter 1 on De republica (“Where Politics Begins”), which “presents Cicero as a thinker concerned with a collective of antagonists and competing interests, against conventional portrayals of his ideal republic as a homogeneous, unified, harmonious community” (20); chapter 2 on Sallust (“Justice in the World”), which argues that “Sallust’s withholding of judgment at the end of Jugurtha signifies the ways in which agents in the decaying republic withhold justice on a larger scale” (20); chapter 3 on Horace Satires I (“Non-Sovereign Freedom”), in which the obvious question (asked only at the end), “what might political and social progressives find worthy of consideration in Horace today?”, is answered with “Horatian satire undoes the claim to sovereignty that usually partners claims to moral judgment” (154); chapter 4 on Cicero’s view of oratory (“Dividual Advocacy”), which “reflects on the Roman preoccupation with faces, situations, the mutability of selfhood, and the degree to which the divided self mirrors the division of the polity” (21); and chapter 5 on Pro Marcello (“Imagination, Finitude, Responsibility, Irony”), which argues that “[b]y adopting hyperbole as the governing figure of this new style of senatorial speech, Cicero holds out the promise not of a morally legible universe, but of a recognition that every Roman now lives in conditions virtually ‘impossible to believe’, the emergence of one ruler, under whom the chains of traditional obligations do not consistently hold” (183). The short conclusion (“The Republic Remastered”) attacks “the tendency, dominant since the nineteenth-century emergence of sociology and economics, to treat human beings primarily as rational calculators or creatures of practical wisdom” (203) and expresses the hope that “close attention to these texts has the capacity to reshape the way we think about civic wisdom—the way schools teach history, literature, civics, and philosophy—about public discourse, especially public commentary on political oratory, and about the conversations we citizens hold among ourselves” (207).I have deliberately used the author’s own words to indicate what the book attempts to do, because I would find it impossible to summarise its argument any other way. Even with these formulae to help, Connolly’s selective and apparently random approach imposes a heavy burden on the reader to construct a coherent framework for her ideas. I think there are two main reasons for this. The first is a direct result of Connolly’s impressive mastery of the political-sciences literature. It is an excellent thing to be so thoroughly familiar with the works of Hannah Arendt, Simon Critchley, John Dewey, Michel Foucault, Dean Hammer, Bonnie Honig, Andreas Kalyvas, George Kareb... (shrink)

McFarland discusses Kant's concept of teleology only insofar as it pertains to natural science, although the concept also has importance for Kant's aesthetics, ethics, and philosophies of history and religion. The study is devoted to an explication of the concept--rather than a developed interpretation-written from the belief that there is "no similar attempt to deal strictly with Kant's treatment of teleology." McFarland is apparently unaware of Klaus Düsing's more comprehensive treatment of the concept in Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff which (...) includes a bibliography of the literature on the subject. Nevertheless, McFarland does draw attention to several crucial aspects of Kant's view and places it in historical perspective, showing its similarity to Hume's argument in the Dialogues. The author points out that teleology functions as a regulative concept for Kant; although we cannot attribute design to the composition of the world, we can use it heuristically to lead us to new mechanical explanations and toward a systematization of knowledge. Moreover, as a subjective principle it enables us to make sense out of organic beings which are unintelligible to us on mechanical models. McFarland argues that since organic purposiveness is a subjective principle of organization it cannot be used to solve the problem of induction and that Kant has not explained why empirical laws are objectively necessary. Although this book omits much, it will be useful to the reader desiring a brief explanation of how Kant uses the concept in parts of the first Critique and in the Critique of Teleological Judgement.--T. P. A. (shrink)

Those familiar with Whitehead's thought may wish to skim Part One: Background and Foundations and pass on to Part Two: Value Theory in General and in Particular, which is Weisenbeck's main contribution to the literature on Whitehead. In discussing the general theory, Weisenbeck calls attention to the relational character of value. He argues that Whitehead's worlds of possible and realized values are essentially related; neither has value apart from the other. Similarly, value is neither wholly in subjects nor wholly in (...) objects; it is a relationship between the valuing subject and the valuable object. The author divides Whitehead's value theory into three principal species: aesthetic, religious, and moral. The chapter on aesthetic values contains a careful examination of Whitehead's distinction between appearance and reality and an analysis of beauty as the highest value. In the section on religious values he discusses man's relationship to God and man's emotional and volitional response to the religious vision of unity and perfection. Of special interest is the section on moral values where Weisenbeck shows the connection between morality and the aesthetic ideals to be attained. In view of his emphasis on ideals and the role of love in human action Weisenbeck would presumably side against those who have attributed a private interest theory to Whitehead. The author has performed an important service in sorting out the various senses of value terms in Whitehead and in tracing their relationships.--T. P. A. (shrink)

The subject matter of this book is not as limited as one might expect from the title. The author's intention is to explicate Kant's concept of geography and relate it to more recent geographical thought, but this project draws him into issues concerning the relationships which the various Kantian sciences bear to each other. What emerges is an account of the architectonic of science as it develops in Kant's thought. May calls attention to the methodological differences between the theoretical and (...) empirical sciences and argues somewhat indecisively that Kant has expanded his view of space and time in the latter. Perhaps the strongest part of the book is May's discussion of the use of teleological judgments as heuristic devices for science. Here he shows the role of the reflective judgment in building up a system of empirical concepts out of the given. A translation of Kant's introduction to Physische Geographie and a bibliography are appended.--T. P. A. (shrink)

In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which (...) is sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Biological Sciences. (shrink)

What MacKinnon offers here is a provocative and original analysis of the meaning of the word "true." His applications are in the areas of statements in general, scientific theories, and theological propositions. One reason for the interest of the book can be found in MacKinnon’s intellectual odyssey. Setting out from a starting-point of standard neo-scholastic textbook philosophy and theology, MacKinnon has come to a highly personal synthesis to which he is willing at least tentatively to apply the label, "ontological pragmatism." (...) Stages along the way—and elements in the synthesis—include Bernard Lonergan’s transcendental Thomism, Wilfrid Sellars’ neo-Kantian version of analytical epistemology, and much detailed work of MacKinnon’s own in analytical philosophy of science. The provocative character of Truth and Expression is likely to bring criticism of the author for misuse of his sources. Wittgensteinian philosophical therapists are likely to bemoan MacKinnon’s relapse into ontologism, even if he qualifies it as a "pragmatic" version. Sellars is likely to object to being lumped with Lonergan, and the latter would probably be upset with the uses to which his former student has put his insights. It may also be worthwhile here to express a demur or two with respect to MacKinnon’s use of his Thomistic sources, e.g., concerning his theory of meaning. It seems that MacKinnon has accepted too naively what might best be called "textbook Thomism." It is true that Aquinas offers a mentalist view, and true also that both Aristotle and Aquinas speak of words as signs of concepts. While this can give rise to a private-language mentalism of the kind Wittgenstein would criticize, it must be recalled that Aristotle and Aquinas were writing not only before Wittgenstein but also before Kant. Whatever can be said of Aquinas’ "mentalism," it is certainly true that in other contexts Aquinas has a social theory of learning that is, at least on the surface, incompatible with a private language theory. Again, with respect to theological truth it seems likely that MacKinnon has been misled by Thomistic manuals, at least when he claims that what Aquinas offers is "a geometrically ordered deductive system" in which "the primacy of Jesus as a revelation of God does not fit." Historical studies of the function of his Summa Theologiae in Aquinas’ scheme for theological education do not support the view of Aquinas as a theological deductive system builder. Nor is it true, as MacKinnon seems to hold, that Aquinas’ view of theological truth is more Aristotelian than biblical. Aside from these qualifications on his use of sources, MacKinnon’s book offers an abundance of critical thinking, analytical insight, and systematic ability. For instance, the reader interested in MacKinnon’s original approach to an adequate epistemology of science will here, in chapter three of Truth and Expression, find the best summary yet of his many contributions in that area. Whether or not, in the last analysis, MacKinnon’s synthesis will be historically significant remains to be seen. What seems likely now is that if it does, the ingredient elements of Lonergen, [[sic]] Sellars, Wittgenstein, Quine, etc., will be more muted, and MacKinnon’s own synthesis will stand on its own. Meanwhile, Truth and Expression will serve as the best guide, pointing in the direction we can expect MacKinnon to follow in the future.—P. T. D. (shrink)

Description: Professor M. Hiriyanna (1871-1950) is recognized in learned circles both in India and abroad as an outstanding authority on traditional Indian philosophy. This monograph attempts to bring his contribution to Indian philosophy to the notice of a wider circle of readers. Deeply versed in Sanskrit classics and equally proficient in English literature, Hiriyanna worked with single-minded devotion to the cause of Indian philosophy and literary studies. This volume brings together the cream of Hiriyanna's contribution, spread over his numerous articles (...) and books, in one conspectus and evaluates his place among the builders of Indian philosophy. Though Hiriyanna did not claim anything like a philosophy of his own, he had a distinctive perception of both the general spirit and the specific concepts and doctrines of Indian philosophy. This book seeks to highlight Hiriyanna's characteristic approach to Indian philosophy in all its aspects. It starts from the general standpoint of Hiriyanna in regard to Indian philosophy and takes the reader through the details of his interpretation of Indian metaphysics and value investigation. Brief, significant quotations from Hiriyanna are given at appropriate places to bring the reader's attention directly to Hiriyanna. The numerous references given to Hiriyanna's works will also be helpful in the study of Hiriyanna in the original. (shrink)

This study attempts to highlight and clarify the central themes in four important theoretical perspectives on the nature of war and the international order. Perhaps because it is an enlarged version of the Wiles lectures, the book is written with a refreshing verve and fluent, relaxed elegance—purchased at the cost of some redundancy and lack of crispness. The bulk of the work consists of four largely independent essays, each dealing with a single thinker or outlook. The essay dealing with Marx (...) and Engels is the most helpful and rich: by focusing on Engels’s voluminous but hitherto neglected military writings, Gallie is able to shed intriguing new light on the revolutionary strategy of the founders of Marxism. It is perhaps not surprising that the most ambitious chapter theoretically, the one on Kant, is the least satisfactory. The author offers a sensible corrective to many misreadings of Kant’s political works and presents a fairly accurate overview of Kant’s internationalist program. But because Gallie fails to take into account either the crucial Kantian concept of the State of Nature or the basic Kantian distinction between virtue and justice, the real difficulties tend to be glossed over, and Kant is made to seem rather less hardheaded, and more moralistic, than he in fact is. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 265 concluding chapter (pp. 150-52), Dr. Clair deals with "Comment lire l'oeuvre du P. Thomassin," providing much guidance to anyone who wishes to avail himself of the rich resources in Thomassin's writings. From the point of view of the history of philosophy, the most interesting aspects of Thomassin's thought seem to be (1) his "Cartesianism," that is, the extent to which he early imbibed Descartes' new ideas, (...) and played a role in the fusion of the views of Augustine, B6rulle, and Descartes that developed in the Oratory, (2) his attempt to find a viable theory of the nature of Grace somewhere between Arnauld and Malebranche, and (3) his efforts to formulate a philosophy of history within an Augustinian theology; a philosophy of history that would make historical research and understanding of genuine philosophical and religious value to man. Dr. Clair's too brief discussions indicate that Thomassin was definitely influenced by reading Descartes, but also that Thomassin was much too eclectic to be a Cartesian. With regard to the problem of Grace, where the Cartesian Arnauld fought with the semi-Cartesian Malebranche, Thomassin tried deftly to maintain an Augustinian position that was not quite as rigid as that of the Jansenists, nor as moderate as that of Malebranche (though Arnauld tried to use Thomassin's erudition and authority in his battles with Malebranche). Unfortunately Dr. Clair does not try to evaluate whether Thomassin really found a coherent and theologically acceptable middle-ground between the two antagonists. On the subject of the philosophy of history, Thomassin's views seem most interesting (at least to this reviewer). The short text that Dr. Clair includes on the difference of history from science reveals Thomassin trying to show that the investigation and comprehension of temporal particulars can have significant value for man's understanding of man and that there can be genuine certainty about past facts. Thomassin was writing in the period when modern historical method and outlook were born, when historical study changed from chronicles and ammunition in theological and political disputes to a basic way of understanding human nature. Those concerned with the role of Bayle, Hume, Gibbon, and Vico in developing an historical methodology and a rationale for art historical approach to human problems might well profit from considering Thomassin's writings in this area, and the influence they had on modern historiography and philosophies of history. Dr. Clair's short work certainly helps in filling a lacuna in our picture of the seventeenth century. It also makes one wish he had done more, and had provided a "complete" study of Thomassin's thought and influence. That, perhaps, is one of the major purposes of this new series, in that it will lead scholars to looking into the more hidden portions of the period, and will lead them to filling out in more detail and depth the history of the rise and fall of modern philosophy. It is to be hoped that future volumes in this series will continue to whet our appetites for further investigations, and will transform more of the names we run across into figures about whom we have some information and from whom we can still learn something. RICHARD H. POPKIN University of California, San Diego Berkeley's Theory of Vision..4 Critical Examination of Bishop Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. By D. M. Armstrong. (Melbourne: University Press; London and N. Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Pp. viii + 106. $4.50). Berkeley's brilliant though disconcerting Essay has been rather neglected for some time, except for the able studies of C. M. Turbayne of Rochester University (N. Y.). Armstrong's book is welcome for that reason, also for its freshness, clearness, and rich brevity. A1- 266 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY though a slim volume, it is packed with close yet lucid argumentation, conducted throughout with good manners, and throughout exploratory, clarifying problems, exposing logical and empirical difficulties, not grandly telling us what the truth is but leaving us in a better position to carry on the exploration ourselves. It is an exemplary piece of philosophical discussion. He clears his ground by noting that the Essay, so far as... (shrink)

This book is an investigation of the relationship between self and body in the Indian, Japanese, and Chinese philosophical traditions. The interplay between self and body is complex and manifold, touching on issues of epistemology, ontology, social philosophy, and axiology. The authors examine these issues and make relevant connections to the Western tradition. The authors' allow the Asian traditions to shed new light on some of the traditional mind-body issues addressed in the West.

An introductory ethics course serves many and often disparate ends, so much so that it may be difficult to find a theme or question that can tie these ends together in a coherent course narrative. This paper shares the author’s attempt to do so. In addition to high student interest in the subject, the topic of our obligation to future generations has the advantage of naturally leading a course through several systematic areas of philosophical importance. This topic lends itself not (...) only to moral theory (e.g. the Nonidentity Problem), but also metaphysics (e.g. the metaphysics of personhood underpinning the Nonidentity Problem), political theory (e.g. utilitarian vs. Rawlsian answers to the question), and applied ethics (e.g. population policies). The author speaks to this topic’s adaptability to various levels of study (introductory, advanced, and graduate) and explains how the theme is taught at each level. (shrink)

The title accurately reflects the two chief philosophic aims of the book: the construction of a theory of inquiry, and of a theory of reality. The author’s intent, announced at the outset, is "to develop a systematic philosophy with the ultimate goal of disclosing the significance of man in the universe." He calls his approach a "pragmatic synthesis," since, he explains, it is a pragmatic defense of the "warrant" and the integration of ordinary and scientific beliefs with propositions affirming emergence, (...) potentiality, and internal relations drawn variously from "emergentism, Aristotelianism, and absolute idealism." He expresses much indebtedness to Dewey and James; he is also inspired by Lester F. Ward. (shrink)

These are the first two of a series of three volumes on Buddhism in modern China; the first deals with the system and institutions of modern Chinese Buddhism, the second with its history. The third volume which is yet to be published will deal with Buddhism in China under the communists. The books are amazingly well written; they show excellent research, much of which was in interviewing monks who had escaped from China. The presentation is well ordered, and the author's (...) style makes even what one would think was uninteresting fascinating. His own divisions best explain what the volumes contain. The first is divided into two parts, Monastic Institutions and the Individual Buddhist. The first part contains chapters on the people of the monastery, the meditation hall, the Buddha recitation hall, observance of the rules, hereditary and branch temples, the abbot, rites for the dead, and the economy of monasteries. The second part on the Individual Buddhist contains chapters on entering the sangha, the monastic career, the lay Buddhist, and the nature of the system. His account shows, contrary to the usual view, that Chinese Buddhism up to the time of communist take-over was still a vibrantly practiced religion. The second volume takes up the problem of the so-called revival of Buddhism in China beginning around the turn of the century. The chapter headings are: the beginnings of the revival, the struggle for national leadership, T'ai-hsü, the lay Buddhist movement, building and publishing, Buddhist education, social action by the sangha, sangha and state, foreign contacts, sects and dissension, Christian stereotypes and Buddhist realities, the meaning of the revival, and a postscript. The "revival" is shown to be mainly a lay movement and a reaction to political pressures which probably would have brought about the diminishment of Buddhism in China even if the communists had not taken over. As with the first volume there is here very little explanation of Buddhist doctrine which the author considered to be beyond the scope of the book. Both volumes warrant repeating that the author researched his topic thoroughly and then wrote his story in excellent prose. Highly recommended.--P. J. H. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 259 to the non-Latin reader; instead, it turns out to be a sort of catalogue of opinions on a wide variety of philosophical topics held by many of the thinkers active in the period: between St: Paul and. Marsilius of Padua. But a few facts and figures will, I think, show why' La filosofia medievale is more properly characterized as Liber Sententiarum than Antologia di testi...... Of (...) the book's 440 pages, 306 are occupied by actual text materials, the balance being. taken up with. bit-bibliographical prefatory remarks to each of the selections, an index, and the Table of Contents. Since selections from the works of thirty-five mediaeval authors are presented (!), an equable distribution of the 306 pages would leave something less than nine pages to be devoted to each writer. But as some of the selected figures, e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, and Ockham, have as many as 29 pages devoted to their writings, the others are given wholly inadequate representation. Now from this it can be easily seen that at best, i.e., where the full upper limit of space is assigned to the writings of any one of the mediaevals, his attack and stand on some chosen philosophical issue might be fairly represented. But when we look to the few men who are thus singled out for special consideration and note that their allotments of pages are spent on a great number of topics, drawn from many different works, the effect within the scope of a single "lengthy" selection mirrors perfectly the patchy and kaleidoscopic character of the entire collection. On the positive side, it must be noted at once that the translations are excellent: faithful and clear. The prefaces, albeit quite general, are accurate and informative; while the bibliographies, particularly those that deal with primary sources, are up-to-date and helpful. Further, it was most gratifying to find that this volume included selections culled from the writings of such oft-referred to, but never-anthologized figures as Peter Damian (289 pages), Gilbertus Porretanus (5~ pages), Vincent of Beauvais (4 pages), and Siger of Brabant (3 pages). An error occurs in the Table of Contents where Giustino, Atenagora, and Tertulliano, who should be listed under "L'apologetica cristiana," are cited under "Nuovo mestamento." To sum up: in a foredoomed attempt to be exhaustive of i momenti pith importanti del travaglio speculativo... dell'umanit~t per oltre 13 secoli, dall'avvento del Cristianesimo alle soglie della Rinascenza (Foreword), the eight collaborating editors of La filosofia medievale bit off much more than even their considerable talents could possibly have chewed--let alone properly digested. As a result, this book of readings, despite the excellences pointed out above, comes off a Book o] Sentences upon which (unlike Peter the Lombard's) only one Commentary can be written: inadequate. HERMAN SHAPIRO San lose State College Juan de Vald~s: la sua vitae il suo pensiero religioso. Con una completa bibliografia delle opere del Vald~s e degli scritti intorno a lui. Seconda edizione riveduta ed aggiornata. By Edmondo Clone. (Napoli: Fausto Fiorentino Editore, 1963. Pp. 225. = Collana di Studi e Testi di Letteratura, VII.) The Spaniard Juan de Vald~s (ca. 1495-1541) is one of the most significant personalities of Reformation times. He represents the flowering of Erasmian religious thought. Vald~s however keeps referring his readers to St Paul rather than to Erasmus. For Vald~s "the 260 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Christian business" is not knowledge but experience. He founds religious certainty on individual inspiration and emphasizes charity against external written law. A man inspired by God becomes autonomous and acquires a mind of his own--independent of external authorities. This valuable study (pp. 5-109) is followed by an extensive bibliography (pp. 113--209) in which it could be added that Vald~s' Al[abeto Cristiano was reprinted in 1948 by the Editorial "La Aurora" of Buenos Aires. In 1946 this publisher considered (in the Preface to his reprint of Vald~s' Dicilogo de Doctrina Cristiana, p. 12) republishing also Vald6s' Ciento y diez consideraciones divinas. PAUL T. FUrIRMAN~ Columbia Theological Seminary Descartes. Oeuvres philosophiques. Tome I (1618-1637.) Textes 6tablis, pr6sent6s et... (shrink)

EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION This volume is a collection of papers presented at the international workshop on “Buddhist Approach to Global Education in Ethics” which is being held on May 13, 2019, at International Conference Center Tam Chuc, Ha Nam, Vietnam on the occasion of the 16th United Nations Day of Vesak Celebrations 2019. The aim is to throw new light on the values of the global ethical system with a focus on the Buddhist approach in deepening our understanding of how Buddhist (...) ethics can deliver a social change in the globalized world. REVIEW OF CONTENTS Prof. P. D. Premasiri in his paper titled “Universally valid ethical norms of Buddhism applicable to global education in ethics” deals with hindrance in determining the basis for global education in ethics and providing undeniable facts about the diversity involved in ethical norms, principles and attitudes of various global communities. The author also discusses the characteristics of Buddhist teaching on a humanistic approach to the moral life with perceptions of enlightened humans, i.e. ‘Knowledgeable Persons’ (vi¤¤å purisà). The paper places further emphasis on the necessity to draw the attention of educators to train the minds of humans on ethical choices in accordance with such decisions. The paper entitled “Teaching Buddhist Ethics through the Life of the Buddha and Jesus” by Abraham Velez De Cea has proposed a new approach to the Buddhist ethical way of teaching and its application through interpretations of the Buddha’s life from the perspective of virtue ethics and meditation. The purpose is to heighten the Buddhist contribution being made to global education in ethical issues. The paper is divided into two parts, Buddhist ethics as a form of virtue ethics and secondly, interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings from the perspective of virtue ethics and meditation. (shrink)

Philosophy challenges our assumptions—especially when it comes to us from another culture. In exploring Japanese philosophy, a dependable guide is essential. The present volume, written by a renowned authority on the subject, offers readers a historical survey of Japanese thought that is both comprehensive and comprehensible. Adhering to the Japanese philosophical tradition of highlighting engagement over detachment, Thomas Kasulis invites us to think with, as well as about, the Japanese masters by offering ample examples, innovative analogies, thought experiments, and (...) jargon-free explanations. He assumes little previous knowledge and addresses themes—aesthetics, ethics, the samurai code, politics, among others—not in a vacuum but within the conditions of Japan’s cultural and intellectual history. For readers new to Japanese studies, he provides a simplified guide to pronouncing Japanese and a separate discussion of the language and how its syntax, orthography, and linguistic layers can serve the philosophical purposes of a skilled writer and subtle thinker. For those familiar with the Japanese cultural tradition but less so with philosophy, Kasulis clarifies philosophical expressions and problems, Western as well as Japanese, as they arise. Half of the book’s chapters are devoted to seven major thinkers who collectively represent the full range of Japan’s historical epochs and philosophical traditions: Kūkai, Shinran, Dōgen, Ogyū Sorai, Motoori Norinaga, Nishida Kitarō, and Watsuji Tetsurō. Nuanced details and analyses enable an engaged understanding of Japanese Buddhism, Confucianism, Shintō, and modern academic philosophy. Other chapters supply social and cultural background, including brief discussions of nearly a hundred other philosophical writers. In his closing chapter Kasulis reflects on lessons from Japanese philosophy that enhance our understanding of philosophy itself. He reminds us that philosophy in its original sense means loving wisdom, not studying ideas. In that regard, a renewed appreciation of engaged knowing can play a critical role in the revitalization of philosophy in the West as well as the East. (shrink)

There is no arguing the impact of Inoue Tetsujirō on the development of philosophy in Japan from the Meiji Restoration through the end of the Pacific War. He was the first Japanese to receive a doctorate in philosophy from Germany and the first native-born chair of the philosophy department at Tokyo Imperial University, the training center for almost all the major Japanese philosophers who graduated before 1915. Inoue was instrumental in making German idealism the Western philosophy of choice for Japan, (...) but he also appreciated Asian traditions as well, having no qualms about claiming there was true philosophy in India, China, and premodern Japan. He set the foundation for academic philosophy in Japan not so much through his own rather simplistic personal philosophy, but especially through his contributions to the organization of the field. This article focuses mainly on Inoue’s troubled relation with Confucianism. On one hand, in seeking a premodern philosophy to serve as the bedrock for modern Japan, Inoue looked to the Edo-period Confucian traditions originating in China. He divided them into Shushigaku, Yōmeigaku, and what he named Kogaku, the school focusing on classical texts preceding neo-Confucian developments and interpretations. In many respects, like so many others of his generation, Inoue was by training and personal preference a Confucian. That is not the whole story, however. Inoue understood Confucianism’s primary purpose as cultivating the social values and order that would ensure an efficient society of human flourishing, stability, and harmony. Yet, he also likely suspected that the people of the new Japan, with its modernization and plethora of Western ideas, would not unquestioningly accept the authority of the Confucian classics, nor be willing to undertake the rigors of textual study that are the hallmark of the Confucian scholar. In Edo-period Japan, that study had been the responsibility of the samurai class, but in their democratization program, the Meiji reformers had abolished the old class system. Education of the young would now shift from the Confucian academies to the new public school system. Always cooperative with the government to the point of being obsequious, Inoue took a leading role in the National Morality program and its installment in the nationwide school curriculum. That curriculum combined a Shinto-based reverence for the sacred nature of the emperor in the kokutai ideology along with practical moralistic values that could be loosely called Confucian. Yet, if schooling for most was limited to the elementary level and if there was no longer a samurai class to oversee the moral behavior of the society, who could nurture and enforce the moral order? Through a set of fortuitous events, Inoue “discovered” bushidō, the Way of the warrior. If there were no longer a samurai warrior class, perhaps all Japanese could become de facto samurai—at least in their mindset. Most may no longer have the scholarly skills and time to glean their spiritual and moral insights from Confucian texts. Yet, they could find the virtues of loyalty, sincerity, filiality, and compliance with seniority within the distinctively mindful heart and spirit of ancient Japan carried within the Japanese bloodline. What happened to the Confucianism of Inoue Tetsujirō? Some of its values were absorbed into bushidō and National Morality, but the praxis of the Confucian scholar and the ideal of the kunshi seem to have been lost, much to Japan’s detriment. (shrink)

Objectives: To quantify the use of do-not-resuscitate orders in a tertiary-care children’s hospital and to characterise the circumstances in which such orders are written.Design: Retrospective study conducted in a 500-bed children’s hospital in Taiwan.Patients: The course of 101 patients who died between January 2002 and December 2005 was reviewed. The following data were collected: age at death, gender, disease and its status, place of death and survival. There were 59 males and 42 females with a median age of 103 months (...) . 50 children had leukaemias, and 51 had malignancies other than leukaemia. The t test and the χ2 test were applied as appropriate.Results: The study found that 44% of patient deaths occurred in the paediatric oncology ward; 29% of patient deaths occurred in the intensive care unit; and 28% of patients died in their home or at another hospital. Other findings included the following: 46 of 101 patients died after attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation and 55 died with a DNR order in effect. The mean age at death was 9.8 years in both groups with or without DNR orders.Conclusions: From the study of patient deaths in this tertiary-care children’s hospital, it was concluded that an explicit DNR order is now the rule rather than the exception, with more DNR orders being written for patients who have been ill longer, who have solid tumours, who are not in remission and who are in the ward. (shrink)

Nugayev’s book is one of the first Soviet monographs treating the theory change problem. The gist of epistemological model consists in consequent account of intertheoretical relations. His book is based on the works of Soviet authors, as well as on Western studies (K.R. Popper, T.S. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, P. Feyerabend et al.) Key words: epistemological model, Soviet philosophy, Western studies .

_Existential and Spiritual Issues in Death Attitudes_ provides: an in-depth examination of death attitudes, existentialism, and spirituality and their relationships; a review of the major theoretical models; clinical applications of these models to issues such as infertility, bereavement, anxiety, and suicide; and an introduction to meaning management theory and how it can be applied to grief counseling. In this new volume, death is treated both as a threat to meaning and as an opportunity to create meaning. The first section (...) introduces theory and methodology to connect the latest empirical research on death attitudes to the philosophical/psychological existential and spirituality literature. Part II presents the latest empirical research on subjects such as end-of-life decisions and living with HIV. The final section considers therapeutic applications to issues including suicide, infertility, bereavement, and anxiety. The concluding chapter highlights the book’s common themes and provides questions to encourage further investigation of the most critical topics. Psychologists, counselors, social workers, physicians, nurses, and religious leaders, as well as academics in the fields of psychology, gerontology, philosophy, religion, counseling, social work, sociology, and medicine will value this new resource. Main points summarize important ideas of each chapter, making it an appropriate text in courses on death and dying and/or and spirituality. Its clinical applications will appeal to practicing professionals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Zen and Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida KitarōThomas P. KasulisZen and Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitarō. By Michiko Yusa. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002. 482 pp.Readers of this journal know that much Buddhist-Christian dialogue over the past three decades has featured Kyōto School philosophy for the Buddhist side of the conversations. The major figures in that school known to the West are Nishida Kitarō, (...) Tanabe Hajime, Nishitani Keiji, Takeuchi Yoshinori, and Ueda Shizuteru. Other philosophers not formally connected to the school but in some ways kindred spirits with it include Watsuji Tetsurō, Hisamatsu Shin'ichi, and Abe Masao. Both individually and collectively these philosophers represent a formidable intellectual tradition, simultaneously challenging and inspiring their Western theological and philosophical counterparts. In surveying the Western responses to the Kyōto School, however, I often find an odd lacuna: the philosophers behind the thought are often absent or, at best, caricatured.The mischief here comes from two directions. On one hand, there are the Western theologians and philosophers who read in translation the works by Nishitani or Tanabe and are astounded by the sophistication of the thought and the way familiar Western philosophical thinkers such as Hegel, Kant, Heidegger, and Plato are interwoven in the arguments. Not being Asian specialists, these readers quite naturally focus on parts of the texts most familiar and intelligible—the interplay with Western ideas and values. This approach has helped Western thinkers discover hidden cultural assumptions in their own philosophizing and religious thinking. Missing, however, is the culturally Japanese character of the Kyōto School philosophers. At least until very recently, these philosophers did not write for a Western audience, but [End Page 268] for their Japanese compatriots. Thus, however much their philosophies might be Western in style and content, it is likely that at least some of their questions (and therefore their answers) were responses to Japanese, rather than Western, concerns. Given the upheaval that Japanese culture and society underwent in the first half of the twentieth century, it is especially important to factor into the equation such contemporaneous cultural concerns.Partly in response to this situation, there has more recently been a response from some Western intellectual historians of Japan who seek to debunk the Kyōto School as a whole, finding in it nothing more than disguised ethnocentrism, jingoism, and imperialism. In making their case, they often ignore the full philosophical systems developed by the Kyōto School thinkers and focus instead on comments from public forums or lectures. Sometimes no more than a few isolated quotations are used to support the case. What is wrong here is not necessarily the claim that Kyōto School philosophy was implicated in the political thought of the wartime years, but rather the cavalier scholarship used to support that claim. A whole school of philosophers tends to be lumped together with little concern for sorting out individual differences. For intellectual historians of this ilk, it is as if books are written by ideologies rather than individuals (or even individual ideologues). Such caricatures of the Kyōto School may even minimize the significance of the fact that some philosophers associated with the movement, Miki Kiyoshi and Tosaka Jun for example, died in prison for their leftist ideas and practices. The Kyōto School is not nearly as hegemonic as some of its critics like to claim.In short, these two commonWestern approaches to reading the Kyōto School philosophers tend either to overlook their Japaneseness or to deny their individuality. Either way, the philosopher disappears from the philosophizing. Here Yusa's book is a vital corrective. Her intellectual biography both Japanizes and humanizes Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945), the founder of the Kyōto School and the inspiration for most of Japan's modern philosophy. Her narrative gives us insight after insight into the concrete contexts in which Nishida's thought developed. Her discussion of each progression in Nishida's thought over his lifetime is framed by relevant events in his family life, his professional career, his interaction with colleagues, and the readings that were inspiring him at the time. Japanese editions of modern writers' collected works commonly... (shrink)

Recent research conducted in Australia shows that many oncologists withhold information about expensive unfunded drugs in what the authors of the study suggest is unacceptable medical paternalism. Surprised by the Australian results, we ran a version of the study in New Zealand and received very different results. While the percentages of clinicians who would prescribe the drugs described in the scenarios were very similar (73–99% in New Zealand and 72–94% in Australia depending on the scenario) the percentage who would not (...) discuss expensive unfunded drugs was substantially lower in New Zealand (6.4–11.1%) than it was in Australia (28–41%). This seems surprising given the substantial similarities between the two countries, and the extensive interaction between their medical professions. We use the contrast between the two studies to examine the generalisability of the Australian results, to identify influences on clinicians' decisions about what treatment information to give patients, and so the tendency towards medical paternalism and, more pragmatically, about how such decisions might be influenced. (shrink)

This is a rather extensive revision of Hick's well-known work of 1957, and is certainly a welcome addition to the literature on this subject—especially in view of the recent resurgence of interest in epistemological problems in the philosophy of religion. Hick has added a good deal of new material, including a chapter dealing with the traditional Thomist view of religious faith as a propositional attitude, and an extensively revised section dealing with the author's theory of faith as "the interpretative element (...) within the religious person's claimed awareness of God." While Hick argues for a definite philosophical thesis he has illuminating things to say about matters of general epistemological concern. Especially worthy of mention are his exposition and critique of the views of William James and his discussion of issues raised by positivistic criteria of meaning. It might be mentioned that the logical problem Hick raises concerning Aquinas' description of the faith of demons can be dispelled by the simple device of holding that the demons see things that humans don't. Altogether, this is a highly recommended book, quite well suited, incidentally, for use in a one-semester course in philosophy of religion.—H. P. K. (shrink)

In this third and revised edition of the first volume on the philosophy of the Church fathers, Professor Wolfson explores the gradual development of a relationship between faith and reason in the early Church and the subsequent speculation that took place concerning the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. At every step of the way, he gives a most painstaking review of the many divergent opinions held, together with the likely derivations of the technical terms in which these (...) opinions came to be formulated. In the final part, which deals with the anathematized, he shows the sources, both within and without Christianity, of what finally came to be known as heresy. Though this work is not, formally speaking, a theological inquiry, it provides an enormous wealth of textual material and references which the inquiring theologian can hardly afford to overlook.--T. S. P. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:AbusesC. S. SchreinerAbuses, by Alphonso Lingis; 268 pp. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, $25.00 paper.Long ago and far away it seemed that academia served as a way station for inventive figures whose nonconformism, demonstrated in their work and lifestyles, was welcomed with graceful suspicion by their colleagues. Philosophy has had its share: one thinks of Wittgenstein and C. S. Peirce, but many lesser Wittgensteins and Peirces somehow (...) adapted and became tenured. In regard to such figures “eccentric” meant outside the circle or off center; “radical” meant surprising, original, sincere. Today radical has a murky political sense. Most radicality takes place in a discourse, or as a discourse—in the title of a university press book—which when invoked aligns the writer with the orthodoxy of a speech community. No surprise; only a dull echo as membership is [End Page 516] confirmed and the circle remains unbroken. Contrary to almost everyone’s intentions, never has so much “identity politics” been melded with the writing act in a metaphysical proof. We write about pragmatism, therefore we are new pragmatists. We write eco-feminism, therefore we are radical eco-feminists.Yet the nonconformist self-image of many philosophers is belied less by the uniformity of their discourse than of their lives, constrained as they are by professional protocol. This situation has become especially painful for phenomenologists whose credos “to the things themselves” and “towards the concrete” mandate a method of worldbound description confirmed by first-person evidence. It is a longstanding embarrassment that most phenomenological studies are either studies about phenomenology, or phenomenologies of books. In this regard even before Of Grammatology it was obvious that there was nothing outside the text.The rare exception is Alphonso Lingis, author of Excesses (1983), Libido: The French Existential Theories (1985), and The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common (1994). So much is obvious to anyone who leafs through his Abuses. The vistas and catastrophes we access through this book cannot be easily disengaged from the personality that guides us to Tenochtitlan, Matagalpa, Kuta, Bali, the Sambodromo in Rio de Janeiro, Khlong Toei, and Chichicastenango. From these places and others Lingis reports the sometimes macabre longings and vulnerabilities of those who have nothing in common except violent changes in heritage and landscape. He speaks to their wounds and of his own ailments he acquires by exposing himself to forsaken circumstances: it is all material for his philosophy. In this work speech is primary, as it was for phenomenologists before Derrida.Merleau-Ponty’s writing remains unsurpassed as an eloquent transcript of perceptual life as expression and bodily engagement. Lingis, who translated The Visible and the Invisible, has from the start of his career been the most interesting and outlandish promulgator of this style of phenomenology. But his focus was decisively turned by Emmanuel Lévinas (whom Lingis has also translated) towards alterity relations, intimate events in which persons defer to and ennoble strangers by taking responsibility for them. Speech and physical contact are precious components of these relations, allowing persons to disburden themselves, to exchange pain and betrayal for tenderness and trust.Lingis shows how alterity relations suffer abuses at the face-to-face level and in the global network of electronic media. We enter his work breathlessly, as into a deep valley where there is gunfire and tropical birds. Spy satellites pass overhead. The human beings are strangely quiet. Women and children are being herded into canvas-covered trucks by youthful militia with oversized weapons. The volatile prose lifts up the voices of the damned just before they vanish around the bend in the jungle. Lingis speaks for them. This is the mandate of his research: “One has to speak for the silenced” (p. 36).How does highly educated thought speak for the tortured and dispossessed [End Page 517] without looking absurd or merely pretentious? Here it won’t do to speak of the world as a text. In this regard the kind of work we find in Abuses is at a vast remove from something like Susan Suleiman’s recently published Risking Who One Is: Encounters With Contemporary Art and Literature. There is nothing peculiar... (shrink)